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KIRK v. MICHAEL REESE HOSP. & MEDICAL CENTER:
THE TREATMENT OF A THIRD PARTY PLAINTIFF IN
A MEDICAL CONTEXT
INTRODUCTION
There is a definite tension between the medical and legal professions
when it comes to imposing liability in a medical malpractice setting.'
Various factions of the legal profession are willing to increase potential
liability in the medical field by expanding the scope of the duty imposed
upon health care defendants. However, the medical industry has moved to
restrict the circumstances in which a duty will be found and liability will
exist. The case of Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center2 illustrates
the conflict between these opposing views.
In Kirk, the Illinois Supreme Court held that it would not accept the
lower court's attempt' to impose liability upon the medical industry without
a showing of the existence of a relationship between the parties to the
lawsuit.4 The Illinois Supreme Court chose to halt any expansion of health
care liability regardless of the potential foreseeability of harm. The court
found this position to be appropriate in view of the legislative intent to
protect the health care industry in light of the current "medical malpractice
crisis." 5
This Casenote will demonstrate that the Illinois Supreme Court's stance
in Kirk may be interpreted as a declaration that the medical industry should
be protected at all costs. This view could be applied to potential areas of
liability not yet addressed by case law or statute. Thus, the danger of
uncertainty exists as to how the lower courts will decide future cases in
light of this decision.
I. BACKGROUND
The concepts of negligence and strict liability provide the two primary
ways in which third parties may impose liability against members of the
medical industry. To differentiate between each cause of action, it is helpful
to explore each theory of liability separately and examine the relation of
1. See infra notes 195-96 for some of the arguments for and against imposing liability upon
the medical field in the wake of an alleged "medical malpractice crisis."
2. 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
3. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 136 Ill. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d 906
(1st Dist. 1985).
4. 117 11. 2d at 531, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
5. Id. at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
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each theory to the relevant parties involved in the lawsuit. Also, it is
important to note the influence the legislature has on a court's decision-
making process in cases which involve a member of the health care field.
A. Negligence
Negligence is one of the most prevalent concepts in tort law. The tra-
ditional elements needed to establish a cause of action for negligence are:
1) The defendant is under a duty or obligation to conform to a standard
of conduct or to take reasonable care so as to guard against creating
unreasonable risks for others; 6 2) The defendant breaches that duty by
failing to conform to the standard of conduct required of him;7 3) The
defendant's conduct causes the harm;" and, 4) The defendant's conduct is
the proximate or legal cause of the harm.9
The same basic elements must also be established to prove a cause of
action when a member of the medical industry, particularly a physician or
a hospital, is involved in a negligence action. Many cases turn upon the
issue of duty in determining whether a cause of action exists.' 0 If no duty
exists between the two parties, the person harmed will have no cause of
action, regardless of the alleged wrong committed by the defendant.
The question of whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court
to decide, while problems of negligence, damages, and causal relation are
questions of fact which the jury decides." Duty has been defined as "an
obligation to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to
some standard of conduct toward another.' ' 2 Even though a duty arises
out of some relationship between the parties, no one has successfully
defined that relationship.' 3 Thus, if a court wishes to impose a duty, a
duty will exist.' 4
6. D. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION: PERSONAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND SOCIAL RESPONSI-
BLITY FOR INJURY 96 (1985); W. PROSSER & P. KEETON, Tm LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164 (5th
ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON].
7. See supra note 6.
8. A causal connection between the harm created and the defendant's conduct must be
premised upon a factual basis. D. Dons, supra note 6, at 97; PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6,
§ 30, at 165.
9. Although a defendant's conduct may have actually resulted in another's harm, the law
may provide that the defendant should not be held liable because considerations of public policy
would counsel against the imposition of liability. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 97; PROSSER &
KEETON, supra note 6, § 30, at 165.
10. See Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 67 Il. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). See also infra
notes 121-27 and accompanying text (discussion of Renslow case).
11. Cunnis v. Brennan, 56 111. 2d 372, 374, 308 N.E.2d 617, 618 (1974); Barnes v. Washington,
56 Ill. 2d 22, 26, 305 N.E.2d 535, 538 (1973); Green, The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases, 28
COLUM. L. REv. 1014, 1022 (1928); James, Scope of Duty in Negligence Cases, 47 Nw. U.L.
REV. 778, 814 (1953).
12. Prosser, Palsgraf Revisited, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1, 12 (1953).
13. Id. at 13. Dean Prosser characterized the determination of duty as "shifting sands" having
"no fit foundation." Id. at 15.
14. "Duty is only a word with which we state our conclusion that there is or is not to be
liability; it necessarily begs the essential question." Id. at 15.
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A court should consider many factors in determining whether or not to
establish a duty. For example, one commentator has suggested that courts
look to administrative, economic, prophylactic, equitable, and ethical or
moral factors when making this determination. 5 Another commentator has
suggested that courts should examine history, conceptions of morals and
justice, social ideas, and convenience in administration of the rule in
determining who should bear the loss. 16
The Illinois Supreme Court has established criteria to determine whether
a duty exists in a given situation. 7 While the court has held that the
foreseeability of harm is a major factor in this determination, foreseeability
is not the sole factor the court considers.18 The court will also look to "the
likelihood of injury, the magnitude of guarding against it and the conse-
quences of placing that burden upon the defendant" in making a duty
determination.' 9 Many commentators and courts have been quick to point
out that foreseeability alone is not a sufficient reason for a court to impose
a duty upon a defendant. 20 For instance, in Lance v. Senior,2' the plaintiff
brought suit for the injury of his nine year old hemophiliac son who had
swallowed a needle while an overnight guest at the defendant's home. 22
The Illinois Supreme Court dismissed the negligence claim against the
defendant, finding that the imposition of a duty upon the defendant would
be unjustified, given the minimal risk of such an event occurring. 23
The Illinois Supreme Court noted that when viewing an event through a
hindsight approach, almost any situation can be found to be foreseeable.
Thus, a duty will not be imposed upon a defendant based upon foreseea-
bility alone. Rather, the court will look to "the likelihood of injury, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the consequences of
placing that burden upon the defendant" as other factors it must take into
account.
24
15. Green, supra note 11, at 1034.
16. Prosser, supra note 12, at 15.
17. Lance v. Senior, 36 Ill. 2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967). See also M. POLELLE & B. OTnrsmY,
ILu.sois TORT LAW 396 (1985) (criteria considered in determining duty are: foreseeability that
conduct would result in harm; likelihood of injury; magnitude of burden in guarding against the
harm; consequences of imposing the burden; public policy; and social requirements).
18. Lance, 36 Ill. 2d at 519, 224 N.E.2d at 233.
19. Id.
20. Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 CoLuM. L. R~v. 1401 (1961).
But however valuable the foreseeability formula may be in aiding a jury or judge to
reach a decision on the negligence issue, it is altogether inadequate for use by the
judge as a basis of determining the duty issue and its scope. The duty issue, is one
of law, is broad in its implications; the negligence issue is confined to the particular
case and has no implications for other cases.
Id. at 1418.
21. 36 111. 2d 516, 224 N.E.2d 231 (1967).
22. Id. at 517, 224 N.E.2d at 232.
23. Id. at 519, 224 N.E.2d at 233.
24. Id. See also Mieher v. Brown, 54 Ill. 2d 539, 301 N.E.2d 307 (1973). In Mieher, the
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1. Physician Negligence
Physician negligence, more commonly known as medical malpractice,
requires that the plaintiff establish elements similar to those found in a
normal negligence action. Illinois courts have determined that the plaintiff
must prove the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty, that the duty was
breached, and that this breach was the proximate and actual cause of the
plaintiff's injury.2
a. Duty of care
Courts take different approaches when determining whether or not a
duty exists. Some jurisdictions take the view that a physician's duty of
care arises only when a physician-patient relationship exists between the
parties involved.2 6 Thus, no cause of action for medical malpractice may
be maintained without first establishing that a contract-based physician-
patient relationship exists.2 7 However, Illinois does not follow this ap-
proach, which incorporates a privity requirement. To impose a duty upon
a physician in Illinois, the courts require "weighing the factors of foresee-
ability of subsequent occurrences, the likelihood of injury, the magnitude
of the burden of guarding against it, and the consequences of placing that
burden on the defendant. '2
This view is exemplified in Davis v. Weiskopf.29 In Davis, the plaintiff
was diagnosed as having a giant cell lesion upon his knee which suggested
a potentially more serious condition? 0 The plaintiff, never informed of the
results of the tests, was referred to another physician.3 However, he
cancelled his appointments with the referred physician who then refused
to treat the plaintiff.3 2 As a result of not obtaining treatment for the lesion,
the plaintiff's leg was amputated.33 The plaintiff brought suit against both
physicians.3 4 The Illinois Appellate Court reversed the decision of the trial
court and allowed recovery against the second physician even though he
Illinois Supreme Court refused to impose liability upon the manufacturer of a truck involved in
a collision with another car. The court held that even if the injury involved was foreseeable,
public policy and social requirements did not impose a duty upon the manufacturer to design a
vehicle to protect against extraordinary accidents.
25. Nichelson v. Curtis, 117 Il1. App. 3d 100, 452 N.E.2d 883 (4th Dist. 1983).
26. Oliver v. Brock, 342 So. 2d I (Ala. 1976); Buckroyd v. Bunten, 237 N.W.2d 808 (Iowa
1976); Podvin v. Eickhorst, 373 Mich. 175, 128 N.W.2d 523 (1964); Fabian v. Matzko, 236 Pa.
Super. 267, 344 A.2d 569 (1975).
27. See supra note 26.
28. Davis v. Weiskopf, 108 Ill. App. 3d 505, 512, 439 N.E.2d 60, 65 (2d Dist. 1982) (Illinois
courts have not considered circumstances of the formation of the physician-patient relationship
or required privity in establishing duty of care).
29. 108 II. App. 3d 505, 439 N.E.2d 60 (2d Dist. 1982).
30. Id. at 506, 439 N.E.2d at 61.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 507, 439 N.E.2d at 61.
34. Id.
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neither treated nor medically advised the plaintiff. 35 The court rejected the
defendant's argument that no patient-physician relationship existed. Instead
the court turned to other factors to establish that a duty existed on the
part of the physician. 36 In its evaluation, the court found that the defendant-
physician was aware of the plaintiff's potentially serious condition. Due
to this knowledge and his lack of prompt medical attention the resulting
injury was likely and foreseeable. 37 The court also found that the burden
of preventing this injury was minimal because prevention could have been
accomplished simply by sending the plaintiff a letter advising him of his
condition and recommending that he see another physician as soon as
possible. 3
b. Breach of duty and the standard of care
Once a duty has been found to exist between the physician and the
patient, the patient must next prove the physician breached this duty. The
patient must show it was the physician's conduct that led to the injury,
and that this conduct fell below the standard of care ordinarily exercised
by a physician in good standing. 39 Generally, three views exist as to how
the standard of care should be determined. These are the "national"
standard, the "same community" standard, and the "same or similar
community" standard. 40
The "national" standard compares the physician's conduct to the stan-
dard of care required of any physician in the country. 41 In the "same
community" standard, a physician's actions are compared to those of
another reasonably well-qualified physician in the same community.42 Fi-
nally, the "same or similar community" standard, employed by Illinois
courts, compares the physician's skill and care to that ordinarily used by
a reasonably well-qualified physician in that community or in a similar
community.4 3 This standard was originally adopted to protect rural physi-
35. Id. at 512-13, 439 N.E.2d at 64-65.
36. See supra note 28 and accompanying text for a list of factors the court uses to determine
if a duty should exist.
37. Davis, 108 111. App. 3d at 512, 439 N.E.2d at 65.
38. Id.
39. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 32, at 187. See also M. POLELLE & B. OrrT=Y, supra
note 17, at 437.
40. D. Doaas, supra note 6, at 314.
41. One argument asserted against the application of the "national standard" is that it works
harsh results in its application to physicians in small towns who might not have access to the
latest equipment. D. DOBBS, supra note 6, at 314. But see PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, §
32, at 188 (some courts have accepted the national standard due to "[the] improved facilities of
communication, travel, availability of medical literature, or the like.").
42. The major problem existing with the application of this standard is the well known
reluctance of physicians to testify against one another. This situation is intensified in jurisdictions
following the "same community" standard if the locale is of small size or one in which physicians
are familiar with one another. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 32, at 188.
43. M. POLELLE & B. 01rLaY, supra note 17, at 440.
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cians who lacked access to major medical centers and continuing medical
education. 4 Today, however, the Illinois courts are less willing to adhere
strictly to the "same or similar community" standard given the advances
in communication and education. 45 Furthermore, the fact that a practice
is "usual" or "customary" with regard to a community does not in itself
always insulate a defendant from a negligence claim. As in other areas, 46
courts have held that an action considered to be usual or customary can
nonetheless be negligent.
47
c. Causation
The final issue to be addressed in a negligence action is that of causation.
To prove causation the plaintiff must establish two things. First, he must
prove that the defendant's breach of duty was the cause-in-fact of his
injury. 4 Second, he must prove that the same breach was also the proximate
cause of his injury. 49
In the area of medical malpractice, foreseeability plays an extremely
important role in the determination of both duty and proximate cause.5 0
In Nichelson v. Curtis," the plaintiff sued both her obstetrician and a
pediatrician who were present during the delivery of her child. Prior to the
child's birth, the plaintiff and her husband had discussed with the obste-
trician the possibility that the plaintiff should be sterilized following the
birth. 2 They agreed to the procedure, but conditioned their acceptance
upon the birth of a healthy child. 3 The pediatrician present at the birth
knew nothing about this precondition to the plaintiff's sterilization.14
At birth, the child was found to have a cleft palate and the potential
for other defects." Immediately after the child's birth, the obstetrician
44. Id. (citing Stogsdill v. Manor Convalescent Home, Inc., 35 111. App. 3d 634, 343 N.E.2d
589 (2d Dist. 1976) as holding that locality rule was justified by difference between technology
and training available in urban as compared to rural communities).
45. Id. (citing Chamness v. Odum, 80 Il. App. 3d 98, 399 N.E.2d 238 (5th Dist. 1979), where
expert from urban center was allowed to testify against chiropractor practicing in small town).
46. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (although it was not general custom for
tugboats to have radios for communicating hazardous weather conditions, reasonable prudence
dictated that they should have been installed and failure to do so was an act of negligence).
47. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965)
(custom of industry is evidence of standard of care but not conclusive), cert. denied, 383 U.S.
946 (1966); Lundahl v. Rockford Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 93 Ill. App. 2d 461, 464, 235 N.E.2d
671, 674 (3d Dist. 1968) (fact that treatment was usual or customary would not preclude finding
of negligence where customary procedure might constitute negligence).
48. M. POLELLE & B. OTrLEY, supra note 17, at 441.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. 117 III. App. 3d 100, 452 N.E.2d 883 (4th Dist. 1983).
52. Id. at 102, 452 N.E.2d at 884.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 102-03, 452 N.E.2d at 885.
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asked the pediatrician to inform the plaintiff's husband of the child's
condition and to ask him if he should continue with the sterilization
procedure. 6 The plaintiff's husband, unsure of what to do, was brought
into the operating room to talk to the obstetrician, after which he consented
to the sterilization procedure.5 7
The child died six weeks after delivery and the mother brought suit.5 8 In
her suit, the plaintiff alleged that the pediatrician had a duty to provide
her husband with a full explanation of the child's health, possible birth
defects, and alternatives to sterilization. 9 She further alleged that the
defendant-pediatrician had breached his duty and was the proximate cause
of her injury. 60
The court held that a physician-patient relationship was not necessary in
order to impose liability, provided the evidence showed that the defendant-
pediatrician had voluntarily assumed a duty to the plaintiff.6 ' The court
found that the pediatrician had not assumed such a duty, since he was not
informed or advised of the agreement made between the plaintiff and her
obstetrician. 62 Furthermore, the court found that the defendant's actions
were not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. 63 The court refused
to impose liability upon the defendant for his failure to inform the plain-
tiff's husband without previously having known of the precondition to the
plaintiff's sterilization. The court viewed this as imposing liability upon
the defendant for the remote and unforeseeable consequences of his ac-
tions .64
2. Hospital Negligence
Many of the same rules and theories used in medical malpractice actions
against individuals also apply to medical malpractice actions against hos-
pitals. 65 The differences that exist are primarily in the areas of the hospital's
duty and the evaluation of the standard of care by which the hospital will
be judged.
a. Duty of care
The hospital's obligation to review and supervise its staff physicians and
its obligation to use reasonable care in selecting physicians are issues the
56. Id. at 102, 452 N.E.2d at 885.
57. Id. at 103, 452 N.E.2d 885.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 103, 452 N.E.2d at 886.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 105, 452 N.E.2d at 886.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. M. PoLELLE & B. OTTLEY, supra note 17, at 444.
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courts have faced in the duty analysis. 66 The principal Illinois case in this
area is Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp.67 In Darling,
the plaintiff was an 18 year old student who had broken his leg while
playing in a college football game. 6 He was taken to the defendant-
hospital's emergency room, where the emergency room physician placed
his leg in a cast. 69 Three days later, the cast was removed after numerous
complaints of pain from the plaintiff.70 Because the cast had been applied
improperly, it was necessary to amputate the plaintiff's leg. 7' The plaintiff
brought suit against the defendant-hospital, alleging negligence by the
hospital in allowing the emergency-room physician to perform this ortho-
pedic work. The plaintiff alleged further negligence in the hospital's failure
to require the physician to subject his orthopedic procedures to review so
as to bring them up to date.7 2 Furthermore, the plaintiff claimed that the
hospital medical staff failed to adequately supervise his case because no
consultation was required after complications arose. 73 Finally, the plaintiff
alleged that the hospital was responsible for the negligence of the nursing
staff, who failed to note the changes in the plaintiff's toe color after his
leg was cast. 74 The Illinois Supreme Court held that the hospital was liable
for negligence for failing to perform each of the following: require the
physician to consult with other members of the medical staff skilled in this
type of procedure; review the treatment given to the plaintiff; and require
that consultants be called in as needed. 71
Many courts have interpreted Darling broadly and found hospitals liable
for negligent supervision of an attending physician's professional acts.
76
Other Illinois courts have relied on Darling to hold that liability can be
placed upon hospitals for negligently granting medical staff privileges to
physicians who were later judged to be incompetent. 77 A distinction has
arisen in the latter cases with regard to when a hospital will be held liable
for the negligence of a physician who uses its facilities. 7 Liability will not
be imposed in situations in which the physician is considered to be an
66. J. SitrH, HOSPITAL LiA.rry § 3.01 (1987).
67. 33 I11. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
68. Id. at 328, 211 N.E.2d at 255.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 329, 211 N.E.2d at 256.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 333, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
76. J. ShuTH, supra note 66, § 3.03[1][b].
77. Id. See also Pickle v. Curns, 106 111. App. 3d. 734, 739, 435 N.E.2d 877, 881 (2d Dist.
1982) (hospital has a duty to know the qualifications and standard of performance of its physicians;
it is a breach of this duty of care to hospital's patients to allow a physician to practice on its
premises who hospital knows or should know is unqualified or negligent).
78. J. Smrri, supra note 66, § 3.03[3][a] (discussing distinction between physician acting as
employee and physician acting as independent contractor).
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independent contractor. However, liability will attach where the physician
is considered an employee of the hospital.7 9 The case of Johnson v. St.
Bernard Hosp. illustrates the distinction between an independent contractor
and an employee.80
In Johnson, the decedent was rushed to the hospital's emergency room
after an automobile accident.8 He was initially treated by the emergency
room physician and was then placed under the care of another physician. 82
Later, the decedent was examined by a third physician employed by the
hospital to take patient history. 3 The primary physician requested a con-
sultation from the hospital staff's orthopedic surgeon, who refused, and
no other orthopedic specialist was consulted.8 4 As a result, the patient died
from a pulmonary embolism caused by a hip fracture. 85
The administrator of the decedent's estate brought survival and wrongful
death actions against the physicians and the hospital.8 6 The court found
that the hospital could be held liable for the negligent actions of a physician
employed and salaried by the hospital, who worked under the direction of
the hospital staff.87 However, the court stated that the hospital could not
be held liable for the acts of a physician who simply rendered medical care
as an independent agent; a physician acting in this capacity was outside
the control of the hospital.88 The court held that the actions of the emer-
gency room physician fell under this independent contractor exception.89
b. Breach of duty and the standard of care
The determination of whether a breach of duty occurs depends upon
whether the hospital adheres to the standard of care required of it. The
standard of care by which a hospital is judged parallels that which is used
to evaluate physicians. The "national," "same community," and "same
79. Id.
80. 79 Ill. App. 3d 709, 399 N.E.2d 198 (1st Dist. 1979).
81. Id. at 711, 399 N.E.2d at 200.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 713, 399 N.E.2d at 201.
86. Id. at 710, 399 N.E.2d at 200.
87. Id. at 714, 399 N.E.2d at 204. See also Johnson v. Sumner, 160 111. App. 3d 173, 513
N.E.2d 149 (3d Dist. 1987) (hospital held liable under a respondeat superior claim by establishing
a principal-agent relationship in the medical setting; relationship was found to exist, provided
physician's actions were under hospital's control and payment made to physician for services
rendered to patients was also made to hospital).
88. Johnson, 79 I11. App. 3d at 714, 399 N.E.2d at 203.
89. Id. at 715, 399 N.E.2d at 203. See also Hoke v. Harrisburg Hosp., Inc., 281 Ill. App.
247, 252 (4th Dist. 1935) (early case involving hospital liability in regard to negligent physician
conduct resulting in x-ray bums inflicted upon a patient; "the principal test as to whether one is
an employee or an independent contractor lies in the degree of control retained and exercised by
the person for whom the work is being done ....").
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or similar community" standards are the criteria used to evaluate a hos-
pital's standard of care. 90 In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court in Darling
v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp.,91 went further and held that
the standard of care associated with hospitals could also be determined by
the state's licensing regulations, accreditation standards, and a hospital's
own by-laws. 92
c. Causation
A plaintiff must establish two elements in order to succeed with a medical
malpractice claim against a hospital. First, he must prove that the defen-
dant's breach of duty was the cause-in-fact of his injury. 93 Second, he must
prove that the same breach was the proximate cause of his injury. 94 Thus,
in defining the actual and proximate cause for the patient's injury, the
court will apply the same criteria to both physician malpractice claims and
those claims brought against a hospital.
3. Negligence With Regard to Third Party Plaintiffs
The general duty which requires a party to refrain from harming others
may also include the obligation to control or attempt to prevent certain
actions of third parties. 95 This area of liability deals with the concept of
duty and turns on whether the courts choose to impose such a duty upon
a defendant for the injury caused to a third party. Unless the existence of
a duty can be established, there will be no cause of action in negligence.
The next section will deal primarily with duty, because the other elements
of negligence (breach of duty, standard of care, and causation) with regard
to third party liability follow the same pattern as any other negligence
claim. Because of the myriad factors used by courts to determine duty, 96
it is helpful to look at a variety of situations involving third party plaintiffs
when deciding whether a duty will be imposed. The courts have not always
found that a duty exists between defendants and third party plaintiffs. 97
90. See supra notes 39-47 and accompanying text. See also J. SMrrH, supra note 66, § 4.02[3]-
[6].
91. 33 111. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d 253 (1965).
92. HospiA. LIAnxrrv: LAW AND TACTICS 318 (M. Bertolet & L. Goldsmith 4th ed. 1980).
See also M. POLELLE & B. OrTLEY, supra note 17, at 445.
93. M. POLELLE & B. OTTLEY, supra note 17, at 441.
94. Id.
95. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 56, at 383.
96. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text.
97. In those cases where courts have found a duty to extend to third party plaintiffs, the
factor of foreseeability appears to be the common denominator. See Division of Corrections v.
Neakok, 721 P.2d 1121 (Alaska 1986) (state has a duty to protect extremely violent parolee's
foreseeable victims, even though they were not specifically identifiable when that parolee was
allowed to return to his small isolated community without any adequate supervision and subse-
quently killed his stepdaughter, her boyfriend and another woman); Orrico v. Beverly Bank, 109
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4. Third Party Plaintiffs in a Medical Setting
A well known case which involves a third party relationship in a medical
setting is the California Supreme Court's decision in Tarasoff v. Regents
of Univ. of Cal.98 In Tarasoff, the defendant was a university hospital
psychologist actively involved in the treatment of a patient. 99 Although the
patient had verbally expressed to the defendant-psychologist his desire to
kill the decedent, the psychologist took no significant action to warn the
victim or to restrain the patient. 100 After the patient killed the decedent,
the victim's heir brought suit against the defendant-psychologist, as well
as the university.101
The court found that the psychologist owed a duty to the victim. The
court based this duty on the existence of a special relationship between the
psychologist and his patient.10 2 Because the resulting action was foreseeable,
and this special relationship existed between the parties, the psychologist
Ill. App. 3d 102, 440 N.E.2d 253 (lst Dist. 1982) (defendant-bank held liable in wrongful death
action when it negligently released funds to the plaintiff's mentally impaired son despite the
plaintiff's warning to the bank not to do so; intervening criminal act of a robber who had killed
the son did not relieve bank from liability since this intervening act was or should have been
foreseen by the bank, even though precise injury was not foreseeable); Neering v. Illinois Cent.
R.R. Co., 383 I1. 366, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943) (plaintiff successfully sued railroad for damages due
to rape and assault that occurred at railroad station; railroad had notice of problems at station
and it was, therefore, foreseeable that injury could occur); Wintersteen v. National Cooperage &
Woodenware Co., 361 Ill. 95, 100, 197 N.E. 578, 582 (1935) ("[I]t is axiomatic that every person
owes a duty of care ... to guard against any injury which may naturally flow as a reasonably
probable and foreseeable consequence of his act, and the law is presumed to furnish a remedy
for the redress of every wrong."); Cunnis v. Brennan, Ill. 2d 372, 308 N.E.2d 617 (1974) (plaintiff
injured when his leg was impaled on drain pipe as he was thrown from car; court held that village
was not liable for its failure to repair pipe because the likelihood of plaintiff's injury was too
remote). However, public policy considerations often enter into the decision of whether to impose
liability. See Lansing v. County of McLean, 69 Il. 2d 562, 372 N.E.2d 822 (1978) (court refused
to impose duty upon county for its failure to remove snow and ice from its roadway which
allegedly resulted in the driving death of plaintiff's wife; court stressed that it did not want to
place the burden upon county of having to put up signs on every icy roadway); Boyd v. Racine
Currency Exch., Inc., 56 Ill. 2d 95, 306 N.E.2d 39 (1974) (currency exchange had no duty to
customer to comply with a robber's demands even though it would result in death of that customer;
it would not be socially beneficial to make businesses civilly liable for failing to comply with
demands of criminals who take hostages since this would only benefit those criminals who were
aware of this civil liability and this would provide them additional leverage with which to enforce
their demands); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 173, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (court
refused to impose liability upon accounting firm for negligently preparing a corporation's financial
statement which plaintiff relied upon in extending credit; to hold defendant culpable would
potentially expose them "to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class.").
98. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976).
99. Id. at 430, 551 P.2d at 339.
100. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 339-40.
101. Id. at 431, 551 P.2d at 340.
102. Id. at 433, 551 P.2d at 342-43.
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had a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the potential victim from
his patient's conduct. 03
Although the existence of some type of special relationship appears to
be a prerequisite to finding liability in a third party context, the exact
knowledge of the victim's identity is not always required. This is exemplified
by the case of Gooden v. Tips.10 4 In Gooden, a patient was given Quaalude,
a sedative-inducing drug. Her physician failed to warn her not to drive
while taking this medication. °0 As a result, the patient lost control of her
car and collided with the plaintiffs' car. The plaintiffs subsequently brought
suit against the physician who prescribed the drug.106
Deciding for the plaintiffs, the court found that while a duty did exist,
it was only a limited duty. 107 The court held that this limited duty required
that the physician give a warning concerning the medication. 08 The duty
did not require the physician to actively control or prevent his patient from
driving. 109
Another case in accord with Gooden is Kaiser v. Suburban Transp.
Sys., 10 In Kaiser, the defendant-physician also prescribed medication to his
patient, a bus driver, without warning him of its tranquilizer-like effects."'
As a result, the driver lost control of his bus and injured the plaintiff-
103. Id. at 434, 551 P.2d at 353. See Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 193 Cal.
Rptr. 733 (1983). The Myers court allowed a plaintiff to recover against two physicians for injuries
the plaintiff received when the physicians' patient lost control of her car and struck the plaintiff.
Because the physicians were aware that their patient was experiencing severe physical and emotional
difficulties, they were negligent in failing to warn her not to drive. Thus, the court extended the
class of potential plaintiffs to include the general public, finding that "under the circumstances
where warning the actor is a reasonable step to take in the exercise of the standard of care
applicable to physicians, liability is not conditioned on potential victims being readily identifiable
as well as foreseeable." Id. at 888, 893, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 733, 738. But see Thompson v. County
of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 614 P.2d 728, 734 (1980) (California Supreme Court would not
allow liability to be placed upon the county for the release of a juvenile offender having violent
propensities towards young children and subsequently killed plaintiffs' son; Tarasoff v. Regents
of the Univ. of Cal. distinguished by holding that plaintiffs had no direct or continuing relationship
with county such that county placed plaintiffs' son in danger and furthermore decedent was not
considered to be a foreseeable or readily identifiable target of juvenile offender's threats). Accord
Furr v. Spring Grove State Hosp., 53 Md. App. 474, 454 A.2d 414 (1983) (court chose not to
impose liability upon state mental hospital for its failure to detain one of its patients who murdered
the plaintiff's son; no duty existed since the victim was not "readily identifiable").
104. 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
105. Id. at 365.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 372.
108. Id. at 370.
109. Id. See Welke v. Kuzilla, 144 Mich. App. 245, 375 N.W.2d 403 (1985) (defendant-physician
liable to plaintiff in a wrongful death action where physician, without any warning given to his
patient, injected her with unknown substance, which resulted in patient losing control of her car
and killing the decedent).
110. 65 Wash. 2d 461, 398 P.2d 14 (Wash. 1965).
111. Id. at 462-63, 398 P.2d at 15.
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passenger." 2 The Washington Supreme Court held that the plaintiff had a
valid cause of action."' The court reasoned that the physician had a duty
to warn his patient, especially given his patient's occupation and the
potential danger to others." 4
A similar case which also involved the imposition of a duty on a physician
is Freese v. Lemmon." 5 There, the physician was actively involved in the
treatment of a patient known to have had previous episodes of seizures." 6
While driving, the patient suffered a seizure, lost control of his car, and
caused injury to the plaintiff-pedestrian. "7 The plaintiff brought suit against
the physician for failure to diagnose the cause of the first seizure and to
learn of the potential for reoccurrence."' Furthermore, the plaintiff alleged
that the defendant-physician acted negligently in failing to advise his patient
not to drive. 19 The Iowa Supreme Court found that the plaintiff alleged
a valid cause of action against the physician.120
While some courts have limited the duty imposed upon defendants in
the area of third party lawsuits, others have expanded the group of potential
plaintiffs who can bring such a suit. This situation is illustrated in the case
of Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp. 21 In Renslow, the plaintiff's mother had
been negligently administered the wrong type of blood 13 years prior to
the plaintiff's birth. This sensitized the mother's blood, causing physical
injury to the unborn plaintiffs in utero development and subsequent
birth. 122
The mother brought suit on behalf of the minor-plaintiff against both
the physician and the hospital, seeking damages for the injuries sustained.
She alleged that the defendants were guilty of negligent conduct as well as
112. Id.
113. Id. at 468-69, 398 P.2d at 18-19.
114. Id. at 464, 398 P.2d at 10.
115. 210 N.W.2d 576 (Iowa 1973).
116. Id. at 578.
117. Id. at 577-78.
118. Id. at 578.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 579-80. See Duvall v. Goldin, 139 Mich. App. 342, 362 N.W.2d 275 (1984). In
Duvall, the plaintiffs were injured when their car was struck by another car driven by the
defendant-physician's epileptic patient. A valid cause of action was found to exist against the
physician. The court held that the physician had a duty to protect individuals who were endangered
by his patient's conduct and that this duty was breached by the defendant's failure'to warn his
patient not to drive. See also Wharton Transp. Corp. v. Bridges, 606 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1980)
(defendant-physician negligently conducted physical examination of driver for plaintiff-trucking
company; physician could be liable for injuries resulting when that driver collided with another
vehicle resulting in the plaintiff paying for the damages to those injured). But see Davis v.
Mangelsdorf, 138 Ariz. 207, 673 P.2d 951 (1983) (recovery not allowed against defendant-physician
for car accident caused by one of his epileptic patients because the physician had last treated
patient 17 years prior to the accident).
121. 67 Ill. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977).
122. Id. at 349, 367 N.E.2d at 1251.
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wilful and wanton misconduct due to their involvement in the administra-
tion of the blood transfusion.'23 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the plaintiff, choosing to extend the duty of care to the plaintiff who
had not yet been conceived at the time the defendants' negligent acts had
taken place.1 24 The court stressed that it was not looking solely to foresee-
ability to determine whether or not a duty should attach in this situation. 25
Rather, it looked to policy considerations and held that medical technology
existed at that time which would mitigate or prevent this type of prenatal
harm.' 26 The court felt that "sound social policy requires the extension of
duty in this case."' 27
B. Strict Products Liability
Products liability involves liability imposed upon those who supply or
are in some way associated with defective goods or products which are
used by others and subsequently result in harm to the user.128 In products
123. Id.
124. Id. at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1256.
125. Id. at 351, 367 N.E.2d at 1253.
126. Id. at 353, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
127. Id. While the court felt comfortable extending duty in this case, it did so only on a
prospective basis. Therefore, this decision only applied to cases arising out of future conduct. Id.
at 354, 367 N.E.2d at 1256.
128. PROSSER & KEErO, supra note 6, § 95, at 677. There are four possible theories of recovery
available today to plaintiffs who wish to bring a products liability claim. These theories are:
I) Strict liability in contract for breach of an express or implied warranty.
2) Negligence liability in contract for breach of an express or implied warranty that
the product was designed in a workmanlike manner.
3) Negligence liability in tort based upon physical harm to persons and tangible things.
4) Strict liability in tort based upon physical harm to persons and tangible things.
Id. at 678. This discussion will be limited to the theory which deals with strict liability in tort.
The concept of products liability was foreign to early tort law. The first case to address the
issue was that of Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In
Winterbottom, the defendant contracted with the Postmaster-General to supply and maintain mail
coaches. The plaintiff was a mail-service employee who was injured when a coach broke down
due to a "certain latent defect." Id. at 109-10, 152 Eng. Rep. at 402-03. The plaintiff brought
suit against the defendant to recover for his injuries. Even though the court acknowledged that a
claim was possible, it did not find that the plaintiff was in the proper position to pursue it. Id.
at 115, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
The court found that a claim did exist based in contract or tort law, but that the only person
able to bring such a claim was the Postmaster-General. Id. Since the plaintiff never contracted
with the defendant, he lacked privity. Thus, without privity between the parties recovery was
prohibited. In making his decision, Lord Abinger discussed the policy considerations involved.
He stated that if the court did not impose the privity requirement, a flood of litigation would
result. Id. at 114, 152 Eng. Rep. at 405.
This original view of privity as a prerequisite to products liability claims was eventually eliminated
in the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
In MacPherson, the defendant, Buick Motor Co., manufactured an automobile which it delivered
to its dealer, who in turn sold it to the plaintiff's husband. While the couple was out driving, the
car collapsed due to a defect in one of the wooden spokes in the wheel. As a result, the plaintiff
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liability cases, a main concern is deciding what type of defect exists. Dean
Prosser classified defects into three categories:
1) a manufacturing defect, which is a flaw in that particular product
itself, present at the time the defendant sold it; '2"
2) a defect in the actual design of the product; 130 and,
3) a failure by the producer of the product to adequately warn of a risk
or hazard associated with the product's design.- M
A discussion of all three of these types of defects is beyond the scope of
this Casenote. However, the third class of defects, inadequate warning, is
relevant to questions of liability in two areas of the health care industry:
pharmaceutical manufacturing and hospital care.
1. Strict Liability in Relation to Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
When applying a strict liability theory to drugs,' 3 2 the pertinent
source of reference is the Restatement.1 3  The Restate-
and her husband were both injured and subsequently brought suit against the defendant-manu-
facturer. Id. at 383, 111 N.E. at 1051. The defendant claimed as its defense that no privity existed
between the parties, because the only privity was between the defendant and the car dealer based
upon their sales contract. In writing for the court, Judge Cardozo rejected this defense. Id. at
385, 111 N.E. at 1053.
Cardozo held that the defendant could not hide behind the privity claim because the manufacturer
knew that this product would be used by persons other than the dealer. Furthermore, it would
be wrong for the defendant to claim it only had a legal duty to protect the car dealer against the
hazards associated with this defective product. Id. The manufacturer assumed a responsibility to
the consumer which did not rest upon the contract, but instead arose from the purchase of the
car coupled with the foreseeability of harm which could occur to the user if the product was
defective. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 96, at 683. Hence, the privity requirement was
eliminated in products liability cases. The general rule today is that a manufacturer or dealer has
a responsibility to the ultimate consumer. This liability is based solely upon the fact that the
manufacturer has dealt with a product which is likely to come into the hands of another and
which will cause injury if it is defective. Id. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210
N.E.2d 182 (1965) (Illinois Supreme Court eliminated privity as a requirement in negligence claim).
See also M. POLELLE & B. OTTLEY, supra note 17, at 553.
129. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 99, at 695.
130. Id. at 698.
131. Id. at 697.
132. In discussing drugs or pharmaceutical products this Casenote's main focus will be upon
prescription or ethical drugs. While some of the concepts discussed may also apply to drug
products sold directly to the consumer, the discussion will be limited to those products which can
only be obtained pursuant to a physician's prescription order.
133. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer:
1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
2) The rule stated in subsection 1) applies although
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ment 134 requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover under a theory of strict
liability must have been the "ultimate user or consumer.' ' 3 5 Additionally,
in a typical strict liability case involving a product, the three elements
needed to establish a cause of action are: 1) the injury or damage resulted
from a condition of the product; 2) the condition made the product
unreasonably dangerous; and, 3) the condition existed at the time the
product left the manufacturer's control. 136
a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1966) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
In particular, pharmaceutical products fall under the direct guise of the drafters' comment k.
k.) Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended use
and ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs. . . . Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by the proper directions and warning,
is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous. The same is true of many other
drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this reason cannot legally be sold
except to physicians, or under the prescription of a physician. It is also true in
particular of many new and experimental drugs as to which, because of lack of time
and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of safety,
or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The
seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared
and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to
be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely
because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id. at § 402A comment k (emphasis in original).
The standard of strict liability embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A was
adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in 1965 in Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). See also MEDICAL PRODUCT LiABuITY: A Coan'IpEHNsivE GUIDE AND
SOURCEBOOK 119 (D. Gingerich 1982).
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 133, at 402A.
135. M. POLELLE & B. OTTLEY, supra note 17, at 579. The case of Winnett v. Winnett, 57 Ill.
2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974), illustrates this proposition. In Winnett, a child was injured when her
fingers became caught in the conveyor belt of her grandfather's farm forage wagon. As a result,
the victim's mother brought suit against the manufacturer of the device based upon a theory of
strict liability. Id. at 8, 310 N.E.2d at 2. The Illinois Supreme Court ruled for the defendant-
manufacturer, finding that the manufacturer's liability only extended to those individuals to whom
injury from a defective product was reasonably foreseeable and only in those situations where the
product was being used for the purpose for which it was intended or for which it could reasonably
and foreseeably be used. Id. at 10, 310 N.E.2d at 4. Thus, to establish a valid claim under a
theory of strict liability, the plaintiff would have to be the ultimate user or consumer, as well as
a party whose injury was foreseeable.
136. Suvada, 32 Ill. 2d 621, 210 N.E.2d 187. While these three elements appear to have little
resemblance to elements typically associated with a negligence claim, the infusion of comment k
adds an interesting element into this analysis. See, e.g., Comment, An Escape from Strict Liability:
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Responsibility for Drug-related Injuries under Comment k to
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 23 DUQ. L. REv. 199, 213 (1984) ("While
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In a products liability case, the main focus of the court is upon the
product and whether it is defective. When dealing with drugs, however,
courts often shift their focus from the product and concentrate instead
upon the reasonableness of the warnings accompanying the product. 3 7 In
doing so, commentators have concluded that the analysis involved is no
longer characteristic of a typical products liability case where strict liability
governs. Instead, this approach incorporates a negligence analysis., as
In Illinois, a duty to warn with regard to drugs was addressed in the
case of Woodill v. Parke, Davis & Co.'39 In Woodill, the parents of a
minor brought suit against a pharmaceutical manufacturer to recover for
injuries suffered by their child during its fetal development. The manu-
facturer's drug, Pitocin, was administered to the mother to induce uterine
contraction and caused various birth defects. 40 In its analysis, the Illinois
Supreme Court held that to impose liability on the drug manufacturer for
its failure to warn of the drug's dangers, the plaintiff must show that the
pharmaceutical manufacturer knew or should have known of these dan-
gers.' 4' Therefore, liability would not exist unless negligence could be
found on the part of the drug manufacturer in failing to learn of the
dangers involved with its product and failing to provide adequate warnings
to compensate for such dangers. 42
A unique feature of drug warnings, as opposed to warnings accompanying
other products, is that the United States Food and Drug Administration has
established certain criteria for these warnings. 43 Many courts, however, view
these government warnings as simply providing the minimum standard.
some courts hold that comment k exempts drug companies from strict liability, others assert that
it merely employs the same language as negligence concepts.").
137. The text of Comment k reads:
The seller of such products, again with the qualification that they are properly
prepared and marketed, and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it,
is not to be held to strict liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use,
merely because he has undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and
desirable product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
RESTATEMENT (SEcorD), supra note 133, at § 402A, comment k (emphasis added).
138. "Dean Prosser has said when a products liability case involves the question of reasonable
warning, the liability is not distinguishable from that which would be found in an ordinary
negligence case." Keeton, Products Liability--Drugs and Cosmetics, 25 VAND. L. Rav. 131, 138
(1972). See also Basko v. Sterling Drug Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (in situations involving
a question of failure to warn, concepts of negligence and strict liability are virtually identical).
139. 79 11. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
140. Id. at 27, 402 N.E.2d at 195.
141. Id. at 30, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
142. As in any situation involving a person having special knowledge in a field or profession,
the pharmaceutical manufacturer is considered to be an expert in its field and courts attribute to
it both actual and constructive knowledge of its product, and any potential adverse reactions
arising from that product. Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen
Adverse Drug Reactions, 48 FoRDHAm L. REv. 735, 749 (1980).
143. Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 C.F.R. ch.1, part 201 (1988). See also Stevens v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 65, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 56, 507 P.2d 653, 661 (1973).
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Consequently, compliance with these standards may not be sufficient to
immunize the manufacturer from liability when a claim is brought for failure
to warn.'"
The primary distinction associated with prescription pharmaceutical prod-
ucts is that the physician's role is interjected into the use of the product.
The majority of states require only that the pharmaceutical manufacturers
warn the prescribing physician and not the ultimate drug user. This is referred
to as the "learned intermediary rule."'' 4 5 Here, the physician acts as the
patient's agent by receiving various warnings and information on the patient's
behalf." It is then up to the physician to decide which warnings he will give
to the patient.
Various justifications have been articulated for the learned intermediary
rule. First, the physician is the most logical conduit for the warning associated
with the drug because he is familiar with the drug's risks as well as his
patient's needs.' 47 Second, if detailed warnings were given directly to the
patient, they might either be misinterpreted or be so difficult to understand
as to be incomprehensible to the patient.' 48 Third, the physician is in a better
position than the pharmaceutical manufacturer to know the needs of a
particular patient. 149 Fourth, the patient usually relies heavily on his physi-
cian's expertise to make decisions.'5 0 Not only can a physician articulate a
warning to a patient, but he can answer any questions the patient may have
regarding the drug.'' Finally, it is believed that it is virtually impossible for
pharmaceutical manufacturers to comply with the duty of direct warning
since there is no sure way to reach the patient. 112
Physicians may obtain warnings in a variety of ways.' The physician may
consult the Physician's Desk Reference or refer to a product's advertisements.
144. Id. See also MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 394 Mass. 131, 140, 475 N.E.2d
65, 70-71 (Mass. 1985) (compliance with FDA requirements, though admissible to demonstrate
lack of negligence, not conclusive on this issue).
145. For an in-depth treatment of the learned intermediary rule see Comment, Products Liability:
The Continued Viability of the Learned Intermediary Rule as it Applies to Product Warnings for
Prescription Drugs, 20 U. RiCH. L. REv. 405, 406-07 (1986) [hereinafter Comment, Learned
Intermediary Rule]. See also Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82 (8th Cir. 1966) (first
case to articulate learned intermediary rule).
146. Britain, Product Honesty is the Best Policy: A Comparison of Doctors' and Manufacturers'
Duty to Disclose Drug Risks and the Importance of Consumer Expectations in Determining
Product Defect, 79 Nw. U.L. REv. 342, 376-77 (1984).
147. Comment, Learned Intermediary Rule, supra note 145, at 413.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Rheingold, Products Liability-The Ethical Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 18 RUTGERS L.
REv. 947, 987 (1964).
153. A physician is able to obtain such warnings as well as other information concerning
pharmaceutical products by consulting with any one of the following: the Physician's Desk
Reference (PDR), the product's package label or inserts, letters provided to the physician from
the pharmaceutical manufacturers, advertisements, and salespersons. Britain, supra note 146, at
385.
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However, the availability of other sources of information will not always
suffice to absolve the pharmaceutical manufacturer from liability if the
manufacturer fails to provide warnings.5 4 Three exceptions have emerged to
circumvent the protection afforded pharmaceutical manufacturers under the
learned intermediary rule. The first exception involves the so called "watering
down" of the warnings associated with the drug product.'55 The warning
provided must be strong enough to trigger appropriate caution. If the
pharmaceutical manufacturer knows that its warning is being widely disre-
garded, the warning will be viewed as inadequate and the manufacturer may
be subject to liability. 56 Furthermore, even the clearest, most complete and
comprehensive warning will be considered inadequate if it can be shown that
the manufacturer dissipated or eroded the effectiveness of the warning
through its overpromotion of the drug.' 57
The second exception to the learned intermediary rule involves cases of
mass immunizations. '58 The learned intermediary rule can only apply in cases
where a physician prescribes or dispenses drugs. 19 If the physician is not
present, the drug manufacturer cannot claim the defense of the learned
intermediary rule.160 Since no physician is involved, there can be no individ-
ualized medical assessment of the risks and benefits associated with admin-
istering a drug during a mass immunization procedure.'16
154. As a general rule, if a pharmaceutical manufacturer fails to provide a warning, regardless
of whether or not the physician would have read it, the manufacturer will not be relieved of its
liability for failing to warn of the risk associated with the drug. Id. at 402. See also Sterling Drug,
Inc. v. Cornish, 370 F.2d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1966) ("The sole issue was whether appellant [phar-
maceutical manufacturer] negligently failed to make reasonable efforts to warn appellee's [patient's]
doctors. If appellant did so fall, it is liable regardless of anything the doctors may or may not
have done. If it did not so fail, then it is not liable for appellee's injury."). But see Stanback v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 657 F.2d 642, 645 (4th Cir. 1981) (pharmaceutical manufacturer insulated
from liability for failure to give warnings associated with a swine flu vaccine because physician
was already aware of risks associated with the drug).
155. Note, The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reac-
tions, 48 Fo iASm L. REv. 735, 752 (1980) ("'proper warning must adequately state the risk"';
warning may be adequate if a stronger warning would be incorrect).
156. See supra note 155 (clearest and most comprehensive warning will be deemed inadequate
if manufacturer knows it is being disregarded).
157. Id. See also Stevens v. Parke, Davis & Co., 9 Cal. 3d 51, 107 Cal. Rptr. 45, 507 P.2d
653 (1973) (drug manufacturer failed to provide adequate warnings due to its "watering down"
of those warnings by overpromotion of the drug to medical profession).
158. Comment, Learned Intermediary Rule, supra note 145, at 414.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 405, 415. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968) (phar-
maceutical manufacturer not immune from liability for injuries arising when its polio vaccine was
administered on a mass immunization scale without physician present). See also Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.) ("[T]he manufacturer of a prescription drug who
knows or has reason to know that it will not be dispensed as such a drug must provide the
consumer with adequate information so that he can balance the risks and benefits of a given
medication himself."), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974). But cf. Boruski v. United States, 803
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The final exception to the learned intermediary rule arises in cases involving
oral contraceptives. 162 In MacDonald v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,163 the
victim was injured due to a stroke allegedly caused by her continued use of
the defendant's birth control pills. 64 The court held that in the case of oral
contraceptives, the manufacturer had a duty to warn the users directly. 65 It
was not relieved of liability simply by providing the physician with the
warnings associated with the drug. 66 The court stressed that, due to the
unique nature of the product, its imposition of liability upon the pharma-
ceutical manufacturer was limited to oral contraceptives.167
2. Strict Liability in Relation to Hospitals
Typically, hospitals are not held strictly liable when defective products are
used in the administration of health care services. 16 The Illinois Supreme
Court, however, has taken a different approach and imposes a strict liability
theory upon hospitals if they administer defective products to their patients.
This is exemplified in the case of Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp. 169
In Cunningham, the defendant-hospital gave a blood transfusion contami-
nated with a hepatitis virus to a patient who subsequently contracted the
disease. 70 The patient brought suit against the hospital based upon strict
liability.'7 ' She alleged that the blood was a defective product, which the
hospital sold to her in an unreasonably dangerous condition.7 2 The Illinois
Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, finding that the dcctrine of
strict liability applied.' 73
The court considered blood to be a product. 74 Furthermore, the product
was considered to be defective because it was contaminated. 175 The court
F.2d 1421 (7th Cir. 1986) (information form adequately disclosed foreseeable risks associated with
a mass swine flu immunization such that it insulated pharmaceutical manufacturer from liability
regardless of whether patient chose to read form).
162. Comment, Learned Intermediary Rule, supra note 145, at 418.
163. 394 Mass. 131, 475 N.E.2d 65, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 920 (1985).
164. Id. at 134, 475 N.E.2d at 67.
165. Id. at 138, 475 N.E.2d at 70.
166. Id.
167. Id. The court also stressed the fact that oral contraceptives differed from other prescription
medications due to four factors: the substantial risks associated with the product's use; the
feasibility of direct warnings by the manufacturer to the user; the limited participation of the
physician in such cases because prescriptions are usually given on an annual basis with no more
follow up accorded the patient; and the fact that the oral communication between the patient and
physician may be insufficient, alone, to apprise the user of the dangers associated with the product.
Id.
168. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 104, at 720.
169. 47 I11. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
170. Id. at 445, 266 N.E.2d at 898.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
174. Id. at 447, 266 N.E.2d at 899.
175. Id. at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
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was unimpressed with the defendant's claim that at the time of the plaintiff's
injury, there was no way to test for the hepatitis virus. 176 It found that the
doctrine of strict liability focuses upon the product's defect, not upon the
knowledge of the manufacturer or supplier. 77 In imposing liability, the court
was careful to distinguish the situation at hand from cases involving drugs. 78
The court reasoned that drugs are inherently dangerous products even when
properly prepared. 179 However, in Cunningham, it was not improper prep-
aration but impurity that caused the blood to be defective. 180 The court's
decision was based, in part, on social policy. It found that because hospitals
constitute one of the biggest industries in this country and profit from the
sale of blood, they should also incur the liability associated with any injury
caused by tainted blood supplies.'
Attempts have also been made to impose strict liability upon hospitals in
cases involving x-radiation treatment. In Dubin v. Michael Reese Hosp.,s 2
the plaintiff-patients were overexposed to x-radiation, which resulted in the
development of malignant tumors. 83 The Illinois Supreme Court found that
this action was an error in the professional judgment of the party adminis-
tering the x-radiation treatment.8 4 The court rejected the plaintiffs' strict
liability claim, finding that the product was not in itself defective. 185 For the
most part, Illinois courts have refused to impose strict liability upon hospitals
in x-radiation cases regardless of whether x-radiation is considered to be a
product. 18 6
176. Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
177. Id. at 53-54, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
178. Id. at 450, 266 N.E.2d at 903-04. While drugs fell under comment k of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A, blood did not. See supra note 133.
179. 47 Ill. 2d at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
180. Id. at 457, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
181. Id. But see Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975) (per curiam)
(blood transfusions should be treated like drugs and therefore the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A comment k should apply) .
While the Illinois Supreme Court was willing to impose strict liability upon hospitals in cases
involving defective blood, the Illinois General Assembly enacted legislation shortly after the
Cunningham decision which held that hospitals could not be held strictly liable for injuries caused
by blood transfusions. J. SrrH, supra note 66, § 10.01[3].
182. 83 Ill. 2d 277, 415 N.E.2d 350 (1980).
183. Id. at 280, 415 N.E.2d at 351.
184. Id. at 281, 415 N.E.2d at 352.
185. Id. See also Greenberg y. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 II. 2d 282, 415 N.E.2d 390 (1980)
(claim in strict liability would not be permitted in case involving x-radiation, but plaintiffs allowed
to proceed with claims based upon theories of negligence and res ipsa loquitur).
186. J. Smrrm, supra note 66, § 10.02[3][b]. Just as with hospitals, physicians will not be held
liable on a theory of strict liability for administering a defective product while rendering health
care services. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 104, at 720. See also Carmichael v. Reitz, 17
Cal. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971) (physician was not retailer of drugs and thus could not be
held under a theory of strict liability in tort).
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3. Strict Liability in Relation to Third Party Plaintiffs
Third party plaintiffs must follow the same criteria established for a normal
strict liability claim in order to establish a valid claim. The third party
plaintiffs must have been the ultimate user or consumer, as well as a party
whose injury was foreseeable.8 7 If this standard is not met, no prima facie
case can be established.
The case of Bobka v. Cook County Hosp. involved a third party plaintiff
alleging a strict liability claim against a manufacturer.' 88 In Bobka, the
defendant was a manufacturer of protective fire clothing. The plaintiff's
father was a fireman who, when exposed to an oil storage tank explosion,
suffered severe burns due to the defective condition of the manufacturer's
clothing. 8 9 The hospital requested that the plaintiff donate large segments
of her skin for her father's skin grafts. The plaintiff experienced discoloration
and scarring of her skin at the sites where she donated skin to her father
for his operation.' 90 The plaintiff subsequently brought suit against the
protective clothing manufacturer for the injury sustained while undergoing
this skin graft procedure.' 9'
The court dismissed the plaintiff's claim, finding that it was not reasonably
foreseeable that the defendant-clothing manufacturer should be liable to a
third party who voluntarily submitted to the skin graft surgery so as to aid
the person injured by its product. 92 The court was not willing to impose
liability because the plaintiff was not the consumer or ultimate user of the
defendant's product and because the resulting injury was not foreseeable.
C. Statutory Reform in the Medical Field and its Potential for
Influencing Court Decisions
There is a belief today that society is facing a medical malpractice crisis. 93
This view has been bolstered in Illinois by recently passed medical malpractice
legislation and the subsequent finding by the Illinois Supreme Court that the
legislation was constitutional. 94 The debate still continues as to whether the
protection afforded the health care industry is appropriate. Various com-
mentators have taken the position that the medical industry has been very
profitable and does not need additional protection against potential mal-
187. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
188. 97 Ill. App. 3d 351, 422 N.E.2d 999 (1981).
189. Id. at 351-52, 422 N.E.2d at 1000.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 354, 422 N.E.2d at 1002.
193. See infra note 196.
194. Bernier v. Burris, 113 Il1. 2d 219, 497 N.E.2d 763 (1986) (constitutionality of Illinois'
medical malpractice reform legislation upheld, even though it was debatable if, in fact, medical
malpractice crisis did exist).
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practice claims. 95 Others have taken the position that using legislation to
limit the liability upon health care providers is justified. 96
Regardless of the rationale for such legislation, a main concern is how
this type of legislation will influence the courts in their decision making
processes. For example, in approving the proposed medical malpractice
reform legislation in Illinois, the Illinois Supreme Court did not consider
whether the legislation was justified. Instead, it simply confined its analysis
to deciding whether the legislation was constitutional and "not whether it
[was] wise as well."' 97 This position demonstrates the judiciary's great def-
erence to the legislature on this issue.
Other state courts have taken a less deferential view toward the passage
of medical malpractice legislation. This is illustrated in the case of Myers v.
Quesenberry. 19s In Myers, a personal injury action arose involving the plain-
tiff and a driver who lost control of her car due to a diabetic attack. 99 The
plaintiff brought suit against the driver's physicians, claiming that they
negligently failed to warn their patient not to drive while she was in an
uncontrolled diabetic condition, a condition complicated by her recent mis-
carriage. 2°° The court found that the plaintiff had a valid cause of action
195. For example, according to a 1982 estimate combined annual net profit of physicians,
hospitals, and drug manufacturers was over $21,000,000,000. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 17, Kirk
v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 117 Il. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988) (Nos. 62700-704). See also J. KELNER & R. KELNER, Medical Malpractice:
Is There a Crisis? N.Y.L.J., Feb. 8, 1984, at 1, 6, col. 2 (New York State Bar Association report
found that: "An objective view leads inescapably to the conclusion that there is, in fact, no
medical malpractice crisis and that the tort liability system is hardly the core factor in the
malpractice problem").
Other commentators have gone as far as to allege that the medical insurance lobby has been
using questionable accounting practices in an attempt to help pass medical malpractice legislation.
P. Pazer, Outgoing President's Message, 18 TRIAL LAwYa's QUARTaLu.Y, Summer-Fall 1987, at
3.
196. For example, one Illinois House of Representative Member's view was that medical
malpractice lawsuits "have caused a crisis of affordability in malpractice insurance to the point
where every citizen of Illinois pays through their healthcare bills for these lawsuits. Additionally,
patterns of specialists leaving the practice of medicine and students not even considering entry
into high risk specialties causes grave concern . . . ." Amicus Brief of the Illinois Hospital
Association and Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council at 10, Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. &
Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988) (Nos.
62700-704) (quoting General Assembly, House Debate, June 18, 1985, at 1-2). See also Comment,
New York's Medical Malpractice Insurance Crises-A New Direction for Reform, 14 FoDHAM
URB. L. J. 773 (1986) (insurance companies have become less willing to insure medical practitioners
because of sharp and continual increases both in the number of malpractice suits being brought
and the size of damage awards and settlements). But see Comment, Medical Malpractice Statutes:
Special Protection for a Privileged Few?, 12 N.KY L. REv. 295, 310 (1985) ("[P]hysicians, using
threats and scare techniques have pushed state legislatures into enacting poorly thought-out
legislation in an almost hysterical atmosphere") [hereinafter Comment, Special Protection].
197. Bernier, 113 I11. 2d at 230, 497 N.E.2d at 769.
198. 144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 193 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1983).
199. Id. at 890-91, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
200. Id. at 891, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
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only insofar as the defendant-physicians had a duty to warn the driver of
the danger. However, the physicians did not have a duty to control her
conduct.2 10 In imposing liability upon the physicians, the court addressed the
issue of the medical malpractice crisis. The court concluded that while the
state's medical malpractice legislation addressed various facets of medical
malpractice claims, it did not change the types of actions a plaintiff could
bring against a physician. Thus, the court found that the changes brought
about by the malpractice legislation were "procedural and economic, not
substantive.' '202
II. THE KIRK DECISION
James Kirk was injured while riding in a car driven by Daniel McCarthy. 23
Prior to the accident, McCarthy was a psychiatric patient at Michael Reese
Hospital, where his physician administered two prescription drugs to him. 2°4
No one had warned McCarthy of the adverse effects, such as drowsiness,
associated with these drugs and that this effect would be intensified by the
use of alcohol. 205 Upon discharge from the hospital, McCarthy consumed
an alcoholic drink. 206 Later in the day, McCarthy allegedly lost control of a
vehicle in which the plaintiff was a passenger; the car left the roadway and
struck a tree, injuring Kirk.20 7
Kirk brought suit against McCarthy, his physicians, Michael Reese Hos-
pital, and the pharmaceutical manufacturers of the drugs McCarthy was
given. 201 Kirk alleged that the physicians, the hospital, and the drug manu-
facturers acted negligently in failing to adequately warn McCarthy of the
drugs' effects and this, in turn, led to Kirk's injury. In addition, Kirk
brought a strict liability action against the hospital and the drug manufac-
turers, alleging that the drugs were in an unreasonably dangerous condition
because the manufacturers had failed to adequately warn of the drugs'
potential effects. 2°9 Kirk also brought suit against McCarthy, alleging negli-
gence in the operation of the car. 210
The trial court dismissed all counts except the one against McCarthy. 21'
The appellate court reversed, finding that all the defendants had a duty to
adequately warn McCarthy about the drugs and that this duty extended to
201. Id. at 894, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 739.
202. Id. at 893, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
203. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 117 II1. 2d 507, 514, 513 N.E.2d 387,
390 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 514-15, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
206. Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 390.
207. Id. at 514-15, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 391.
210. Id.
211. Id.
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cover members of the public who may be injured as a proximate cause of
the manufacturers' failure to adequately warn.212 Aside from the negligence
theory, the court also employed a strict liability analysis to find both the
hospital and the drug manufacturers liable to Kirk. 213
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated the
judgment of the trial court. 2 4 The Illinois Supreme Court took the position
that Kirk could not bring suit because he was not within the class of persons
to whom a duty of care was owed by either the physicians or the hospital.2'3
This lack of physician-patient relationship precluded his claim against the
defendants.216 The court also found that no strict liability claim existed
against the hospital and the drug manufacturers.2 17 Because the drug man-
ufacturers could not have foreseen the injury, they were absolved of liabil-
ity. 21 Regarding the hospital, the court found that it owed no duty to Kirk,
because he was merely a passenger in McCarthy's car and not a patient of
the hospital or a user of the drug products. 21 9
In a separate opinion, Justice Simon concurred with the court's decision
regarding the hospital's liability, but disagreed regarding the physicians' and
drug manufacturers' liability. 220 He believed that the plaintiff had a valid
claim against these defendants for failure to adequately warn of the drugs'
dangerous propensities. 22' Justice Simon found that the physicians' liability
was grounded in basic concepts of negligence, and that their failure to warn
resulted in injury to a foreseeable class of persons.2 2 Furthermore, he noted
that this additional liability would create no extra burden upon physicians
with regard to precautionary measures since all a physician would have to
do to avoid liability would be that which was already expected of him.223
Regarding the strict liability claim against the pharmaceutical manufacturers,
Justice Simon believed that the court erred in dismissing the plaintiff's claim
based upon the learned intermediary rule.2 2 4 He believed that the issue of
whether the warnings given by the pharmaceutical companies were adequate
was best left to the "trier of facts. 2 5
212. Id.
213. Id. at 515-16, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
214. Id. at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
215. Id. at 532, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 522-23, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
218. Id. at 521, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
219. Id. at 522-24, 513 N.E.2d at 394-95.
220. Id. at 533, 513 N.E.2d at 399 (Simon, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 534, 513 N.E.2d at 400 (Simon, J., dissenting).
222. Id. (Simon, J., dissenting).
223. Id. at 537, 513 N.E.2d at 401 (Simon, J., dissenting). Physicians are expected to inform
their patients of the side effects of prescription medication.
224. Id. at 538, 513 N.E.2d at 402 (Simon, J., dissenting).
225. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
When discussing the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kirk v. Michael
Reese Hosp. & Medical Center,226 the case should be viewed in its component
parts as they relate to the parties involved. The case's central issue deals
with whether a third party plaintiff has a valid cause of action against
various members of the medical industry for their alleged failure to ade-
quately warn. The pivotal matter concerns the duty element and whether
that duty extends from the defendants to the plaintiff in this case.
While the appellate court was content to simply view the duty associated
with the defendants as a single issue common to all of the defendants, 227 the
Illinois Supreme Court took the correct approach by analyzing separately
the duty pertaining to each group of defendants. In a medical context, it is
essential that each defendant in a multiple defendant case be treated differ-
ently because, although all defendants are in the medical field, each defendant
owes a different duty. Just as a nurse's duty will differ from that of a
physician's, so too will a hospital's differ from a drug manufacturer's or a
physician's. The analysis of this case must, therefore, be divided accordingly.
A. The Physician's Duty and the Third Party Plaintiff
In Kirk,28 the Illinois Supreme Court found that no duty existed which
extended from the physicians to the plaintiff, James Kirk. Thus, the physi-
cians could not be held liable for Kirk's injuries due to their failure to warn
their patient, Daniel McCarthy. 229 The court based its decision on various
reasons. First, in making its duty analysis, the court found that, as a general
rule, the issue of whether a duty exists is a question of law to be decided
solely by the court. 2- Second, the court found that the duty could be
determined by looking at various factors. While foreseeability is one impor-
tant factor, a duty determination must take other factors into account, such
as the probability of injury occurring, the hardship of guarding against the
injury, and the consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant. 23'
Third, the court addressed the importance of a relationship between the
parties involved in this type of suit. The Illinois Supreme Court was uncom-
fortable imposing liability upon any potential defendant. Instead, the court
required that to establish a duty, the plaintiff had to have had a physician-
patient relationship with the defendant-physician 232 or some type of "special
relationship" with the physician. 233 However, the court provided that a
226. 117 111. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
227. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 136 I11. App. 3d 945, 483 N.E.2d 906 (1st
Dist. 1985), rev'd, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987).
228. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 117 Il1. 2d. 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987),
cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
229. Id. at 532, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
230. Id. at 525, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
231. Id. at 526, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
232. Id. at 528, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
233. Id.
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limited duty to warn could exist if the plaintiff was a "specifically identifiable
potential victim," and not simply a member of the general public. Members
of the general public are considered to be an "indeterminate class of potential
plaintiffs. '23 4 In Kirk, the court did not find the plaintiff to be a "specifically
identifiable potential victim," but rather a member of the general public.235
The final reason the Illinois Supreme Court used to deny the existence of a
duty dealt with recently passed legislation. In light of the state's enactment
of medical malpractice reform legislation, the court found that public policy
and social requirements mitigated against finding such a duty to exist. 236
In Kirk, various consistencies as well as inconsistencies arose in the court's
analysis. First, there is no controversy concerning the court's application of
the steadfast rule that a determination of duty is a question of law and,
therefore, an issue for the courts to decide. 2"3 Likewise, the various factors
the court used to determine whether a duty existed have been well established
by previous Illinois case law. 238 Instead, it is the third and fourth reasons
the court used which have engendered some debate.
The third reason the court used to justify its decision is the importance
of a relationship between the parties involved. 2 9 While a physician-patient
relationship is present in the majority of lawsuits where a physician is a
defendant, this is not always the situation. For example, in the case of Davis
v. Weiskopf ° the court allowed the plaintiff to bring a claim against a
defendant-physician where the plaintiff had been referred to the physician
but never had any type of contact.241 In making its determination, the Illinois
appellate court stressed that a physician-patient relationship was not a nec-
essary prerequisite to establishing a cause of action. 242 The court found that
the normal determination of duty should guide its decision of whether to
impose a duty upon the defendant. 243
The concept of a "special relationship" between the plaintiff and the
physician is an ambiguous one. Its genesis is found in the case of Renslow
v. Mennonite Hosp.244 There, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a physician
who had negligently administered a blood transfusion to the plaintiff's
mother 13 years earlier had a duty to the plaintiff, as well as to her mother
for the harm caused to the plaintiff at birth.245 The "special relationship"
234. Id. at 532, 513 N.E.2d at 398-99.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 527, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
237. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
239. Kirk, 117 11. 2d at 532, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
240. 108 Ill. App. 3d 505, 439 N.E.2d 60 (1982). See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying
text.
241. 108 Ill. App. 3d at 511-12, 439 N.E.2d at 64-65.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 512, 439 N.E.2d at 65.
244. 67 Il. 2d 348, 367 N.E.2d 1250 (1977). See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
245. Id. at 357-58, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
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found to exist was that between the mother and the plaintiff. 246 Here, the
court again stressed the notion that foreseeability alone was not the sole
determining factor, but that "sound social policy" required that duty be
extended .247
In light of Renslow, one may speculate as to whether the court would
have come to a different decision in Kirk had the plaintiff been related to
McCarthy. For example, if Kirk had been McCarthy's son, would this now
place him in the class of those having a "special relationship"? Likewise, if
Kirk was McCarthy's fiancee and they were on the way to be married the
day of the accident, could it be said that Kirk could only have a claim if
the accident had occurred after the marriage ceremony was completed? If
these examples illustrate the court's position, then it appears that the court
has a rather narrow view as to who may recover, and only those related by
blood would have a valid cause of action.
Based on Renslow, one may draw even more narrow boundaries as to
whom a duty could extend. For example, what if McCarthy was a woman,
and as a result of the car accident she gave birth to deformed children?
Here it would appear that the court might assert that under Renslow only
these children could bring claims against the physicians prescribing the
medication to their mother. Thus, the court may in effect be 'saying that the
"special relationship" found in Renslow only applies to that relationship
between a mother and her unborn children.
In any of the hypothetical scenarios above, the court's precedent could
provide another court with the ability to construe the scope of duty narrowly.
The logic of some of the distinctions the court draws and the court's
consideration of the equities appear to be somewhat wanting. Regardless of
whether a "special relationship" exists, the party involved in such an accident
still suffers an injury through the same set of events. The negligence on the
part of the physicians is no less, nor the injuries any easier to bear, simply
because the injured party was not related to the patient in some way.
In making its decision, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that a plaintiff
may recover without having any type of relationship, provided that at the
time of the injury he was a "specifically identifiable potential victim. ' 248 In
taking this view, the court acknowledged that a limited duty to warn does
exist, but only in situations in which the victim can be readily identified.
This view is illustrated by the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Cain
v. State,249 which the Illinois Supreme Court referred to in Kirk.210 In Cairl,
a mentally retarded youth with a propensity to start fires was released into
the care of his mother for Christmas vacation. While there, he started a fire
at his mother's apartment which resulted in the death df his sister and the
246. Id. at 357, 367 N.E.2d at 1255.
247. Id.
248. Kirk, 117 Il. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 398-99.
249. 323 N.W.2d 20 (Minn. 1982).
250. 117 Ill. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
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destruction of surrounding residences."' The youth's mother and other
apartment tenants brought suit against the state, alleging that the state had
been negligent in releasing the youth. The plaintiffs also alleged that the
state had breached its duty to the plaintiffs by failing to warn them of the
youth's dangerous propensities. 25 2 The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled in
favor of the state. The court found that a duty to warn only existed when
specific threats were made against specific victims. 253 Therefore, since the
youth did not pose any more of a danger to the plaintiffs then he did to
any other member of the public, the court held that there was no duty to
warn. 24 Based on the outcome of this case, the view of the Illinois Supreme
Court is that unless the defendants could see that Kirk, specifically, would
be riding in McCarthy's car at the time of the accident, he could not recover.
While the court chose to limit potential plaintiffs to only those who are
"specifically identifiable," it also acknowledged that other jurisdictions had
taken a more liberal view as to potential plaintiffs in an action similar to
the one found in Kirk.255 Even in fight of these other decisions, the court
believed its decigion'to limit potential plaintiffs could be justified on the
basis of public policy.
25 6
The final reason the Illinois Supreme Court relied on in support of its
decision not to impose a duty upon the defendant-physicians is somewhat
controversial. The court referred to Illinois' recent enactment of medical
malpractice legislation.2 57 From this, the court concluded that the legislature's
goal was to reduce damages against the medical profession., Therefore, the
court determined that to expand physicians' liability to third parties would
not be in keeping with this goal .218
While the court may be justified in deferring to the legislature in certain
situations, its deference lere is unjustified. Aside from the heated debate as
251. Cairl v. State, 323 N.W.2d 22 (Minn. 1982).
252. Id. at 21.
253. Id. at 26.
254. Id. at 25-26. The Minnesota Supreme Court relied upon the California Supreme Court
cases of Thompson V: County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728 (1980), and Tarasoff
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) to reach its decision.
In Tarasoff, see supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text, there was a specifically identifiable
potential victim known to the defendant-psychologist. Thus, the California Supreme Court found
that the defendant had, at a minimum, a duty to warn. However, in Thompson, see'supra note
103, that same court found that no duty to warn existed in a parallel case. In' Thompson a
juvenile offender, who had made a threat to kill a child in his neighborhood, but-had not specified
who exactly his victim would be, was released. The court held that the county had *no. duty to
warn since the victim was not a foreseeable or readily identifiable target. Thompion v. County
of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728 (1980).
255. 117 Ill. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 398-99 (1987). See supra notes 104-20 and accompanying
text. But see supra notes 97 and 103 for a discussion of some cases adhering to the Illinois
Supreme Court's position.
256. 117 Ill. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
257. Id. at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 396-97.
258. Id.
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to whether such legislation is merited, 2 9 the courts should not be swayed
blindly by the passage of legislation. This particular legislation was passed
with specific provisions in mind. 260 For the court to construe the statute
broadly so as to enter into any matter concerning the medical industry is
contrary to the legislature's intent. If the court were to follow this pater-
nalistic view toward the medical industry, any subsequent lawsuits pertaining
to liability in areas where it has not yet been established could be barred.
For example, technological advances in the medical field which are potentially
dangerous could be insulated from liability. The court could, in effect, use
this statute as a type of "talisman," so as to justify its decision to favor
the medical industry in any upcoming lawsuits.261
In actuality, the court did use this talisman to diffuse one of the plaintiff's
strongest arguments. The plaintiff asserted that all that the physician would
have to do to avoid liability would be to give a warning in regard to the
dangers associated with a drug.2 62 Thus, there would be no requirement that
the physician physically control or prevent the actions of the patient. Rather,
the physician would only be held liable for not giving a warning to his
patient, which was something he was already required to do.263 The Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the appellate court's position that the innocent
victims rather than the wrongdoers need protection. 264 Instead, the court
claimed that to impose liability even in these limited circumstances would
still result in a potential increase in liability against the health care profession.
This argument was in conflict with the General Assembly's goal of reducing
liability.261 It is essential that the court not lose sight of the legislature's
goals and desires. However, it is equally as important that the judiciary not
lose sight of its role. The judiciary is a separate entity and not merely a
"rubber stamp" for the legislature. The system of checks and balances must
not be abandoned simply because the issue may not be of constitutional
proportion 266
259. See supra notes 193-96 and accompanying text.
260. See Bernier v. Burris, 113 111. 2d 219, 235, 497 N.E.2d 763, 779 (1986) (medical malpractice
legislation dealt with such issues as periodic payments of future damages, punitive damages, and
attorney fees).
261. But see the discussion of Myers v. Quesenberry, 144 Cal. App. 3d 888, 193 Cal Rptr. 733
(1983), supra notes 198-202 and accompanying text. A California court found that even with the
passage of state medical malpractice legislation, the belief was that the legislation was to effect
the law only procedurally and economically as opposed to substantively. Myers, 144 Cal. App.
3d at 888, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 733.
262. 117 III. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
263. Id.
264. Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Center, 136 II1. App. 3d 945, 951, 483 N.E.2d 906,
912 (lst Dist. 1985).
265. 117 Ill. 2d at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
266. If the Illinois Supreme Court did wish to comply with the legislature's intent while still
imposing a duty upon the physicians in Kirk, it could have done so by taking the approach used
by a Texas court in Gooden v. Tips, 651 S.W.2d 364, 366 n.l (Tex. Ct. App. 1983). For details
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B. The Hospital's Duty and the Third Party Plaintiff
In Kirk,2 67 the Illinois Supreme Court found that Michael Reese Hospital
had no duty which extended to the third party plaintiff. The hospital's failure
to warn its patient, Daniel McCarthy, did not subject it to liability for the
injuries of the plaintiff. The first reason the court used to support this
decision dealt with the warning itself and the physician's role in its convey-
ance. 26 The second reason concerned the unique relationship which exists
between a physician and a hospital and how that relationship affected
liability.2 69 The final reason pertained to the court's application of its duty
analysis. 20
The court first discussed the fact that warnings given to a patient regarding
the use of prescription drugs are a function delegated to the physician rather
than the hospital.2 7' This theory appears to be consistent with the court's
acceptance of the learned intermediary rule, 272 given the fact that a physician
is in the best position to evaluate his patient's needs and to decide which
warnings are most appropriate. The relationship between a doctor and a
patient is considered to be very confidential and private. To place the hospital
in the position of a participant in this relationship may hinder, rather than
promote, the benefits associated with this relationship.
The second reason the court used to justify absolving the hospital from
any liability dealt with the working relationship which exists between hospitals
and physicians. Generally, a hospital will not be liable for the acts of a
physician unless the physician is an employee of the hospital. 273 However,
in some circumstances the hospital may incur liability for the acts of a
physician considered to be an independent contractor. This will result if the
hospital grants the physician medical privileges and he is later found to be
incompetent. 274 Thus, in Kirk, the court found that the defendant-physicians
were not employees, but rather independent contractors. 27 Therefore, it
would be contrary to past precedent to impose liability upon the hospital
for the actions of independent parties who were found to be competent.
of this case see supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text. The Illinois Supreme Court could
have distinguished the action in Kirk from that of a typical medical malpractice action by holding
that, because no physician-patient relationship was established between the plaintiff and the
defendant-physicians, this was not a medical malpractice claim. Thus, the concerns associated
with the medical malpractice crisis would not apply.
267. 117 Ill. 2d. 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
268. Id. at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 396-97.
271. Id. at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
272. In Kirk, the Illinois Supreme Court finally adopted the learned intermediary rule, even
though the lower courts in Illinois had previously been using it. Id. at 513, 513 N.E.2d at 393.
See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the learned intermediary rule.
273. See supra notes 66-89 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
275. 117 I11. 2d at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 395.
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The final reason the Illinois Supreme Court used to justify its decision
concerned its analysis of the situation under its duty determination test.276
Under this view, the court took the position that the injury involved was
not foreseeable to the hospital. 27 7 The plaintiff failed to allege that the
hospital's employees either knew, or should have known that the warnings
regarding the medications were not given by the physicians to McCarthy.2 71
The Illinois Supreme Court's view in this regard is correct. A hospital assumes
that any of the physicians using its facilities will act as reasonable practi-
tioners and provide warnings when needed. It is not the hospital's job to
search out every potential error a physician could make and take steps to
prevent it. If the error is one the hospital employees knew or should have
known about, this would place responsibility upon the hospital. 279 If the
error is known and poses a potential danger to the patient, then the hospital
should be held liable if it refuses to take steps to rectify that threat to its
patient.
The court next addressed the unreasonableness of the burden on the
hospital and concluded that to hold the hospital liable for all the harmful
acts committed by its released patients would place an unreasonable burden
upon the institution. 280 This statement in itself is ambiguous. The plaintiff
in Kirk was not looking for the hospital to be an absolute insurer of all the
harms caused by its patients. Rather, he asserted that the hospital should be
held liable only for its negligent actions which led to the third party's injuries.
Thus, the court appears to brush aside the plaintiff's claim in Kirk with its
reasoning that a hospital should not be held liable as to all acts wrongfully
committed by its former patients.
Finally, the court again discussed the recently enacted medical malpractice
legislation to justify its decision on social and public policy grounds. 2 ' For
the same reasons discussed above, concerning physicians, this argument has
some merit. Still, it is far from being an overwhelming reason for refusing
to find the hospital liable. 28 2
C. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' and Hospital's Relation to the
Third Party Plaintiff Under the Guise of Strict Liability
276. This duty analysis focuses not only upon the foreseeability of the injury occurring but
also on the "likelihood of injury, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against it and the
consequences of placing that burden upon the defendant." Id. at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 396. See
supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text for other cases using this same type of duty analysis.
277. 117 II1. 2d at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
278. Id. at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
279. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 111. 2d 326, 330, 211 N.E.2d 253,
257 (1965).
280. 117 I11. 2d at 516, 513 N.E.2d at 396.
281. Id. at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
282. See supra notes 259-66 and accompanying text.
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1. The Pharmaceutical Manufacturers' Liability
The Illinois Supreme Court found that the plaintiff had failed to state a
cause of action regarding the pharmaceutical manufacturers' liability.283 While
the court was willing to concede that failure to warn of a product's dangerous
propensities may serve as a basis to hold the manufacturer strictly liable in
tort,2 84 the court found that the situation in Kirk did not rise to the level in
which liability should be imposed. The court based its decision upon the
learned intermediary rule28 5 and the foreseeability aspect 2 6 of the case.
The court stressed that the situation involving pharmaceutical products
differs from a typical products liability case. Here, the drug manufacturer's
warning is to be distributed only to the physician and not directly to the
ultimate consumer.2 7 Thus, it is the physician's medical judgment which
comes into play as to which warnings are ultimately passed on to the patient.
Because the pharmaceutical manufacturers had no duty to assure that warn-
ings were distributed to the patient, they likewise could not be held liable
for their failure to warn a non-patient.
On its face, the court's opinion took a logical approach. The warnings
must be distributed to the physician, therefore, it is completely up to the
physician to decide which warnings will be distributed to the patient. The
only flaw in the court's analysis was its failure to address the substance of
the warnings which the pharmaceutical manufacturers provided. As the
dissent pointed out, the court merely dismissed the plaintiff's claim against
the drug makers without ever addressing the issue of whether the warnings
by the pharmaceutical manufacturers to the physicians were in fact accu-
rate. 28 No evidence was given as to whether the warnings could have been
insufficient or "watered down. ' 28 9 While the court's approach may have
been correct with regard to its substantive application of the learned inter-
mediary rule, procedurally, the approach taken by the court is questionable.
As Justice Simon discussed in his dissent, the issue of whether the warnings
provided by the pharmaceutical manufacturers were adequate was not a
question of law, but rather one to be judged by the trier of facts. Conse-
quently, by not allowing this portion of the case to be litigated, the plaintiff
was denied his opportunity to prove that these warnings were inadequate. 29°
Thus, the court dismissed this portion of the case rather than address the
case on the merits as to whether the warnings were adequate.
283. 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988).
284. Id. at 512, 513 N.E.2d at 391-92.
285. Id. at 513, 513 N.1.2d at 393.
286. Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
287. See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text for a discussion of the learned intermediary
rule.
288. 117 Il. 2d at 522, 513 N.E.2d at 402 (Simon, J., dissenting).
289. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of an exception to the
learned intermediary rule which exists when a drug product is overpromoted or its warnings are
widely disregarded.
290. 117 Ill. 2d at 522, 513 N.E.2d at 402 (Simon, J., dissenting).
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Regarding the foreseeability aspect of the claim against the pharmaceutical
manufacturers, the court followed the holding in Winnett v. Winnett.291 The
Winnett court held that strict liability will be applied only where persons
injured by the defective product may reasonably be foreseen and only in
situations where the product was used for the purpose for which it is intended
or for which it is reasonably foreseeable that it may be used.292 The court
concluded that under Winnett, it was not plausible that the pharmaceutical
manufacturers should have reasonably foreseen the events that occurred,
that is, that their drugs would be administered by the physicians without
any warnings given, that the patient would be discharged from the hospital,
consume alcohol, drive and then lose control of his car which in turn would
result in injury to the plaintiff-passenger. 293 Therefore, given the improba-
bility of injury to the plaintiff, the court felt justified in dismissing the strict
liability claim against the pharmaceutical manufacturers rather than allowing
a jury to determine the question of foreseeability.2 4
While the court's approach appears to be justified, one problem does arise
in its analysis. In tort law, actions are measured by the reasonable man
standard. 295 The problem arises in that depending upon how an event is
presented, the view of whether the event is foreseeable can change. The court
appears comfortable in discussing the foreseeability factor with regard to the
specific occurrences of the particular case. For example, the pharmaceutical
manufacturers could not have reasonably foreseen that their drugs would be
administered by the physicians without any warnings given, that the patient
would be discharged from the hospital, consume alcohol, drive and then
lose control of his car which in turn would result in injury to the plaintiff-
passenger. 296 These statements are, in themselves, couched in specificity. If
one was to narrowly construe the court's position, foreseeability could be
precluded in almost any situation in which the injured party encountered a
number of arguably ordinary experiences. 297 For example, is it so unforesee-
able to the pharmaceutical manufacturers that a patient might not be given
a warning as to the sedative effects of a drug and that this failure to warn
results in the patient's involvement in a car accident in which another party
291. 117 I11. 2d at 513, 513 N.E.2d at 393 (relying on Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11. 2d 7, 310
N.E.2d 1 (1974)). See supra note 135 for a discussion of the case.
292. 117 I11. 2d at 513, 513 N.E.2d at 393.
293. Id. at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
294. Winnett, 57 Ill. 2d at 11, 310 N.E.2d at 5 ("Questions of foresecability are ordinarily for
a jury to resolve . . . but where the facts alleged in a complaint on their face demonstrate that
the plaintiff would never be entitled to recover, that complaint is properly dismissed."). See also
Kirk, 117 I11. 2d at 513, 513 N.E.2d at 393.
295. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 6, § 32, at 173.
296. 117 I11. 2d at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
297. Of course, this is not to say that superceding intervening conduct by other parties cannot
be a defense. Rather, the court's approach appears to be unfair in that it requires the injured
party's actions to be known to the defendant with some type of specificity before a valid cause
of action can exist.
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is harmed? Of course, this is not to say that foreseeability should be the
sole determining factor upon which to impose liability. However, the court's
treatment of and reliance on the foreseeability factor in this set of circum-
stances is ill-conceived.
2. The Hospital's Liability
The Illinois Supreme Court also found that the plaintiff failed to state a
cause of action against the hospital.29 In making its determination, the court
followed almost the same reasoning it used to absolve the pharmaceutical
manufacturers of liability. The Illinois Supreme Court referred to the learned
intermediary rule and held that it is the physician who is in the best position
to deliver warnings to the patientY99 Also, the court indicated that the
pharmaceutical manufacturers are only required to provide information to
the physicians and not to other health professionals in the hospital because
it is the function of the physician to prescribe medication. 3°°
One of the main concerns the court had in making its decision not to
hold the hospital liable involved past precedent in the field of strict liability
as applied to hospitals. The court analogized the situation in Kirk to cases
involving injury caused by x-radiation.30 In those cases, the court found
that the injury caused by the x-radiation was due not to a defect associated
with the product, but rather due to an error in judgment on the part of the
physician involved.302 Likewise, in Kirk, the court concluded it was physician
error which resulted in the injury. The drugs, like the x-radiation, were not
inherently defective, but rather, it was the method in which they were
administered that resulted in the harm.303 Accordingly, the hospital and the
pharmaceutical manufacturers were absolved of liability.
The court's view is proper in light of the approach that Illinois takes in
relation to the Restatement3°4 and how the Restatement distinguishes the
strict liability approach as applied to drug cases from that applied to other
products. Thus, just as pharmaceutical manufacturers would be absolved of
any liability, provided that proper warnings were distributed to the physi-
298. 117 111. 2d at 514, 513 N.E.2d at 394.
299. Id. See supra notes 145-67 and accompanying text.
300. 117 11. 2d at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 395. One argument that can be made against the court's
assertion that only physicians have access to drug information is that pharmaceutical manufacturers
will often provide similar drug information to other health professionals, such as nurses and
pharmacists. Even if no information was sent directly, the package insert accompanying each
prescription drug would suffice to inform the health care practitioner as to which warnings he
should convey to the patient.
301. Id. at 515, 513 N.E.2d at 394-95.
302. Id. See supra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
303. But see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 II1. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970)
(strict liability claim was appropriate against hospital which administered defective blood since
contaminated blood was considered to be a defective product). For a more in-depth discussion of
this case, see supra notes 169-81 and accompanying text.
304. Restatement (Second), supra note 133, at § 402A comment k.
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cians, the same view would apply to liability regarding the hospital.
D. Summary
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kirk is correct insofar as it found
no liability for the hospital and the pharmaceutical manufacturers. However,
while the court reached the correct result, it used the wrong means to obtain
it. The court was justified in turning to the learned intermediary rule, but
erred in not actually considering the merits of the warnings pertaining to
the drugs. Rather than acting as a "trier of fact," so as to test the sufficiency
of the warnings, the court assumed the warnings were sufficient. °5
The court erred in its decision not to impose liability on the physicians.
The physicians in this case acted negligently towards their patient, McCarthy.
In so doing, they set in motion a dangerous situation which foreseeably
culminated in injury to an innocent third party (Kirk). To impose liability
upon a physician would not result in any great burden to the profession,
given that the means to avoid liability would be minimal. To avoid liability,
all a physician would have to do would be to give a warning to his patient,
an act which is already required of him. While it may be true that this
approach would increase the number of plaintiffs who can bring an action
against a particular physician, it would be -more equitable to require that a
negligent physician incur the cost of his mistake than to require a totally
innocent plaintiff to absorb the costs.
IV. IMPACT
A. The Practical Effect of the Kirk Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision could have effects which reach
beyond the scope of the facts of Kirk. The Kirk court narrowly construed
the scope of liability of the medical profession. This is exemplified by the
court's concern with the recently passed malpractice legislation and the
court's interpretation of the legislative intent.? 6 Depending upon how the
lower courts interpret the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kirk, the
result could be an overall change in the way in which the medical industry
is treated in Illinois.
The Kirk case could result in lower courts limiting the types of actions
which could be brought against medical defendants. The Kirk court did not
see the plaintiff's claim as a typical negligence or strict liability claim and
therefore would not allow it to be presented to a jury.a07 Likewise, the lower
courts may view this as an indication of the Illinois Supreme Court's
unwillingness to accept any new, creative or novel approaches in imposing
305. See supra notes 288-90 and accompanying text.
306. 117 11. 2d at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 396-97 (1987).
307. Id. at 519, 513 N.E.2d at 399.
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liability upon the medical industry s08 If this approach is taken, plaintiffs
will have difficulty establishing a successful claim where the claim departs
from established case law. The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kirk
may trigger a change in the treatment the medical industry receives in the
Illinois courts. The court's decision may be viewed as a signal to the lower
courts to provide greater judicial protection for the medical industry. In
light of the perceived legislative goal "to reduce the burden existing in the
health professions as a result of the perceived [medical] malpractice crisis," 3°9
lower courts may place a greater burden upon the plaintiff in an action
simply because the defendant is in the medical field. 10
The final result which may evolve from the Illinois Supreme Court's
decision in Kirk may be a lowering of standards throughout the medical
industry. If the medical industry is under the impression that the Illinois
courts are becoming more defense oriented, there will be less incentive to
take precautionary measures to protect potential victims."' Therefore, rather
than pursuing research or taking additional steps to safeguard patients and
others that may be affected, those in the medical field may simply choose
to provide the minimum level of care which has already been established.
B. The Legal Effect of the Kirk Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kirk could be interpreted in two
ways. First, it could be narrowly construed to stand for the proposition that
the court will not allow a third party plaintiff to recover from a health care
308. This fear of expanding liability in the medical field was expressed by the defendant-hospital
in its argument that "if a duty is recognized in this case there would be no logical or just stopping
point and the new liability would be urged in all kinds and manner of claims by unknown parties
.... .Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 14, Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 117
Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387 (1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988) (Nos. 62700-704).
309. 117 Ill. 2d at 517, 513 N.E.2d at 397.
310. Such an argument was made by the plaintiff when it contended that the medical malpractice
legislation "did not grant special privileges to the medical industry.. .[and] did not grant absolute
immunity to the medical industry either from malpractice or strict tort liability." Plaintiff-Appellee
Brief at 96, Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 513 N.E.2d 387
(1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1077 (1988) (Nos. 62700-704). See also Amicus Brief of Illinois
Trial Lawyer's Association at 5, Kirk, supra ("[P]roviding such a special privilege for doctors,
drug manufacturers and hospitals would provide society with nothing in return. Therefore such
discrimination in favor of these groups is not warranted ... [t]]he innocent victims need the
protection, not the doctors, hospitals, or drug manufacturers."). But see Amicus Brief of the
Illinois Hospital Association and Metropolitan Chicago Healthcare Council at 9, Kirk, supra
("[The Governor's task force reported that 'Illinois is accelerating through the first stages of a
crisis in medical malpractice and today stands on the edge of a medical system that is beginning
to deteriorate dramatically."').
311. See Comment, Special Protection, supra note 196, at 301 (Mr. Robert Cartwright of the
American Trial Lawyers Association described benefits associated with medical malpractice liti-
gation by quoting 1974 Health, Education and Welfare legislative report which stated that: "At
the present time medical malpractice litigation is clearly the most significant external pressure
prompting physicians to practice quality medicine.").
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professional when he is not a patient or involved in a special relationship
with that patient. Thus, the court's decision would apply only to situations
having a fact scenario similar to Kirk.
The Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Kirk could be broadly construed
to apply to all cases involving the medical industry. Here, the lower courts
would be put on notice to avoid expanding liability where a health care
defendant is involved. Furthermore, the courts would be encouraged to take
a more protectionist attitude toward the medical field. This construction
would be based upon the Illinois Supreme Court's perception that the
legislature's view regarding the "medical malpractice crisis" must be consid-
ered in all such judicial decisions. Thus, the end result would be a bias on
the part of the Illinois courts in favor of defendants associated with the
health care field.
V. CONCLUSION
The Illinois Supreme Court's approach in Kirk exemplifies a protectionist
attitude by the court towards the medical field. The court in this case was
unduly influenced by the character of the parties involved. Public policy
decisions and an approach to imposing liability should not turn on the desires
of the health care industry or those of a potential victim. In a given case,
all factors must be examined and social and individual benefits must outweigh
the burdens before liability is imposed. It is essential that lower courts weigh
all relevant factors before imposing or refusing to impose liability. A court
should not harbor a predisposition because one of the parties to a suit is an
actor in a particular industry.
Robert P. Giacalone
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